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This chapter connects scholarly conversations to date (August 2019) on current and future 
EU and UK immigration rules and on EU citizenship as a status that entails a bundle of 
transnational rights. It concludes that in a case of no-deal Brexit, both UK nationals in EU-27 
and EU citizens in the UK will face a future of complex European, national and international 
agreements, losing many EU citizenship rights they currently have. With the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement in limbo, it remains to be seen which rights - and to which extent - 
will be incorporated into the transitionary legal arrangements across the EU Member States 
and the UK, as well as how far they will feature in the negotiations and the final text of the 
future EU-UK partnership agreement. One thing is certain: the concept of EU citizenship, 
with normative aspirations of a self-standing legal status that seemed to offer much hope in 
the ‘golden age’ era of Grzelczyk, Baumbast, Martínez Sala, Rottmann or Ruiz Zambrano, 
has been abandoned. It cannot be extended by the concept of acquired rights, continues to be 
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And I have promised to bring you up out of your misery […]  
into the land […] flowing with milk and honey1 
 
1. Introduction 
As Brexit continued to unravel, many migrant EU citizens, both in the UK and outside the 
country, were waiting for the European Commission and the UK government to reach an 
agreement on their rights. During this time, grassroots civic organisations such as 
the3million, New Europeans and the British in Europe continued to lobby for securing EU 
citizens’ rights at home and abroad, with many UK based EU nationals voting with their feet2 
or obtaining more ‘useful’ passports, while the Irish nationals and those in Northern Ireland 
were worried about the Northern Irish border and the continuity of peace and the fate of the 
Good Friday Agreement. In the whirlpools of the Westminster Parliament, somewhere lost 
was the draft Withdrawal Agreement, which, despite the previous EU-UK negotiations, hung 
stuck among political disagreements and calls for 'better options' for the free and 
independent Great Britain,3 holding the lives of people and businesses in custody. With the 
new Prime Minister elected, the UK Government seems to be gearing up towards a no-deal 
Brexit, building up the current preparations, amidst the concerns over the overstretched civil 
service. 
It is this complex socio-political context that informed the key research question of 
this chapter: what rights and legal protection will 5 million mobile EU citizens4 have when 
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law at Anglia Ruskin University and Fellow at the Centre of European Law at 
King’s College London. I am thankful to the book’s editors for a very thorough and helpful peer review 
process that helped improve this chapter, which was completed on 5 September 2019. 
1 The Bible, Exodus 3:17. 
2 Office for National Statistics, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: February 2019’ (Office for 
National Statistics) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmi
gration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/february2019> accessed 17 March 2019. 
3 See Patrick Birkinshaw and Andrea Biondi, Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of 
United Kingdom Exit from the EU (Wolters Kluwer 2016). 
4 In 2017, an estimated 3,813,000 EU citizens were living in the UK, including the children born there:  
Carlos Vargas-Silva and Mariña Fernández-Reino, ‘EU Migration to and from the UK’ (2018) 
<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/eu-migration-to-and-from-the-uk/> 
they become third country nationals in the post-Brexit EU? What legal guarantees - if any - 
could they rely upon under the current legal framework of European, national and 
international law? How far would such a framework protect the rights that have been 
developed as core status of the European Citizenship? If these rights cannot be retained, 
what do such legal realities tell us not only about the fragility of the EU citizenship as an 
idea, but also its longevity and even future survival in the world where liberal democracies 
are being challenged by fake news and the rise of nationalism?  
Some of these questions have been raised by scholars,5 but the ground for further 
reflections remains fertile. Losing transnational citizenship due to Brexit leaves a vacuum 
between national and international rules, which may or may not offer some protection to 
people who will lose EU citizenship status.6 This vacuum – from EU legislation perspective – 
means that EU migration and asylum law will apply only to non-EU citizens and only in the 
manner prescribed by EU legislation which often has a ‘limited equal treatment clause’.7 In 
other words, the loss of EU citizenship for UK nationals in EU-27 is likely to mean the end of 
strong equal treatment protection they had benefitted from under the EU free movement 
law, unless similar rights are guaranteed by future national legislation or international 
agreements. 
 
accessed 18 March 2019. According to 2015 data, at least 1.2 million UK nationals currently reside in 
other EU Member States: United Nations Global Migration Database, ‘International Migrant Stock by 
Destination and Origin’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.asp> 
accessed 16 March 2019. 
5 For an excellent outlook, see the special issue of NILQ: Dagmar Schiek, ‘On the Never-Ending Road 
to Brexit: Perspectives for the European Union – Introducing This Special Issue’ (2018) 69 Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 221. 
6 Francesca Strumia, ‘European Citizenship and Transnational Rights: Chronicles of a Troubled 
Narrative’ in Daniel Thym (ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free 
Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart Publishing 2017) 166–167. 
7 Sara Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Constitutional Status of Foreigners and European Union Citizens: 
Loopholes and Interactions in the Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights’ in Daniel Thym (ed), 
Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart 
Publishing 2017) 260. For a detailed review, see Sonia Morano-Foadi and Karin de Vries, ‘The 
Equality Clauses in the EU Directives on Nondiscrimination and Migration/Asylum’ in Sonia Morano-
Foadi and Micaela Malena (eds), Integration for Third-Country Nationals in the European Union. 
The Equality Challenge (Edward Elgar 2012). 
This chapter builds on the above debates and goes further, drawing together the 
various doctrinal and normative arguments about EU citizenship post-Brexit, providing a 
broad birds-eye view of the legal protection of UK nationals in the EU and EU nationals in 
the UK, assessing the present regulation of their rights and suggesting ways forward for the 
future. To achieve this, we will briefly consider the development of EU Citizenship before 
Brexit (section 2) and proceed to assess the post-Brexit legal framework of EU citizenship 
rights at the international, EU and national levels, focusing on the protection of the rights 
guaranteed for the EU citizens in the UK (section 3) and British nationals in EU-27 (section 
4). Overall, the chapter challenges the view of EU citizenship as a stand-alone political and 
legal status, concluding that the normative view of Union citizenship which seemed to offer 
much hope in the ‘golden age’ era of the Court of Justice’s case law has been abandoned 
(section 6). At this stage of European integration, Union citizenship cannot be extended by 
the concept of acquired rights, it continues to be tied to Member State nationality and woven 
into the strict black-letter-law wording of EU legislation (section 7). 
 
2. When EU Citizenship Met Brexit 
The story of EU citizenship has been told by many and in most engaging ways,8 and its 
relationship with Brexit is only one of the key moments of its young existence of 26 years 
since Maastricht. Built on the foundations of the narrative of free movement as a migration 
discourse,9 this supranational legal status, which displays cosmopolitan features, could be 
seen to represent the ‘hollowing of national citizenship on the one hand and the rise of the 
 
8 E.g. Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Woods despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and 
Its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 13; Alina Tryfonidou, The Impact 
of Union Citizenship on the EU’s Market Freedoms (Hart Publishing 2016); Dimitry Kochenov (ed), 
EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017); Adrienne 
Yong, The Rise and Decline of Fundamental Rights in EU Citizenship (Hart Publishing 2019). 
9 When comparing the rights of EU citizens and third country nationals in EU law, Strumia observes 
that international law gives an unfettered right for Member States to determine their own migration 
policies. Considerations on how certain Member States monetize EU citizenship by offering 'golden 
passports' provide a good example on such ‘nationalisation’ of EU free movement rights. Hence losing 
transnational citizenship due to Brexit leaves a vacuum between national and international rules, 
which may or may not offer some protection to people who will lose EU citizenship status; see Strumia 
(n 7) 153, 156–7, 166–7. 
cosmopolitan as a threatening alternative on the other,’10 with the Brexit vote expressly 
rejecting the latter. Clearly, a pragmatic legal-political construct of Union citizenship differs 
from national citizenship because the Union ‘has not established a sacrificial culture and has 
not turned domestic societies into societies of control and surveillance’.11 Despite this, the EU 
citizenship, as it is currently construed in EU Treaties, legislation and case law, has been 
criticised for driving the ‘invisible legal wedge’ between the haves (the mobile EU citizens) 
and the have nots (those who cannot afford or are unable to move), raising concerns of social 
justice, equality and social exclusion across borders.12 The recent cases on welfare benefit 
access across borders for non-economically active EU citizens, illustrate the opening gap of 
Europe’s social deficit that fails to address also the issues of ethnic equality across borders.13 
Thus critical perspectives on EU citizenship appraise it as too idealistic, too political, too 
unjust,14 a status that prioritises the freedoms of the selected few who can allow themselves 
to free movement. 
As the story of EU citizenship is one very closely linked to migration and movement 
across borders, it is no surprise that one of the key political arguments behind the Brexit vote 
was about reducing immigration from the EU countries at all costs. To see the broader 
picture, we must recall that Europe's contemporary story of external immigration started 
after the Second World War, with increase of migrant workers before 1970s oil crisis. At the 
 
10 Stephen Coutts, ‘Citizens of Elsewhere, Everywhere and . . . Nowhere? Rethinking Union Citizenship 
in Light of Brexit’ (2018) 69 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 231, 232. 
11 Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post-Brexit and the European Union’s 
Duty to Protect EU Citizens’ (2018) 56 Journal of Common Market Studies 854, 857. 
12 Dimitry Kochenov, Graínne De Búrca and Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Hart 
Publishing 2015); Charlotte O’Brien, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the 
Cautionary Tale of the UK (Hart 2017); Dimitry Kochenov and Timofey Agarin, ‘Expecting Too Much: 
European Union’s Minority Protection Hide-and-Seek’ (2017) 1 Anti-Discrimination Law Review 7; 
Uladzislau Belavusau and Kristin Henrard (eds), EU Anti-Discrimination Law beyond Gender (Hart 
Publishing 2018).  
13 Egle Dagilyte and Margaret Greenfields, ‘United Kingdom Welfare Benefit Reforms in 2013–2014: 
Roma between the Pillory, the Precipice and the Slippery Slope’ (2015) 37 Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law 476; Egle Dagilyte, Adam Lazowski and Panos Stasinopoulos, ‘The Importance of 
Being Earnest: Spelling of Names, EU Citizenship and Fundamental Rights’ (2015) 11 Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy <http://www.cyelp.com/index.php/cyelp/article/view/233>. 
14 Elaine Fahey and Tawhida Ahmed, On Brexit: Law, Justices and Injustices (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2019); Jakob Huber, ‘EU Citizens in Post-Brexit UK: The Case for Automatic 
Naturalisation’ (2019) 0 Journal of European Integration 1.  
time, family migration was the main way to settle in Europe and since then more restrictive 
national immigration policies have been introduced.15 While the intra-EU migration became 
regulated with the establishment of the 1957 Treaty on the European Economic Community, 
the European Union’s independent immigration and asylum policy was introduced by the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which came after the introduction of EU citizenship by the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Since Amsterdam, several regulations and directives were 
adopted, which are likely to apply to UK nationals post Brexit, unless special arrangements 
are made.  
Today, EU citizenship is a special status that can be acquired only by holding a 
nationality of one of the Member States.16 Not only it guarantees non-discrimination based 
on nationality and the freedom of movement and residence, but a plethora of other rights 
that often result due to the combination of these two. Such rights include equal access to 
local labour market, education, healthcare, welfare benefits (with some limitations) and 
pensions, the right to vote in European Parliament elections, to propose EU legislation, and 
to obtain consular support abroad.  While on the face of it – judging from Articles 20 and 21 
TFEU – the EU citizenship has a very general personal and substantive scope, it is limited by 
the Citizenship Directive,17 which prescribes stronger rights for those who carry out 
economic activity or have sufficient resources and healthcare to live independently in 
another Member Sate.18 
Despite these European developments, most immigration policies are still regulated 
at national level today, with several Member States – the UK, Ireland and Denmark - not 
being parties to the EU external immigration regime. Such legal regulation means there is 
 
15 Pieter Boeles and others, European Migration Law (2nd edn, Intersentia 2014) 25–28. 
16 Article 20(1) TFEU. 
17 Directive (EC) 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77 38. 
18 Anne Wesemann, ‘European Union Citizens in Post EU UK’ in Karl August Sachsen Gessaphe, Nils 
Szuka and Juan J Garcia Blesa (eds), Legal Implications of Brexit (Fern Universität in Hagen 2018) 7. 
already a huge fragmentation19 of legal landscapes across the Union, especially when it 
comes to integration of immigrants and labour immigration of unskilled third country 
nationals.20 This fragmentation presents difficulties in evaluating future EU citizens’ and UK 
nationals’ rights after Brexit, especially as core EU citizenship rights relate to free movement, 
residence and non-discrimination.  
 Before proceeding to analyse the situation of UK nationals in EU-27, let us first 
consider current and future regulation of the rights of EU citizens in the post-Brexit UK, 
assessing what assurances - if any - the concept of EU citizenship may provide them. 
 
3. EU-27 Nationals in the Post-Brexit UK 
Brexit will cause reduction of EU citizenship rights not only for UK nationals, but also for EU 
citizens who currently reside or will arrive in the UK in the future. At the outset, however, we 
must acknowledge the special status of Irish nationals under UK migration law, who will 
have a more privileged status, as they will not be required to apply for legal recognition of 
residence due to the Common Travel Area arrangements. 21 As for other non-Irish EU 
citizens in the UK, if the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) is not signed,  their residence rights 
will have to be provided by UK national law, ‘subject only to certain international human 
rights obligations.’22 
During negotiations of the WA,23 the UK Government kept referring to the 'special 
relationship' between the UK and the EU that is due to be preserved, whatever the outcome. 
 
19 Oliver Garner, ‘After Brexit: Protecting European Citizens and Citizenship from Fragmentation’ 
[2016] EUI Working Paper LAW 2016/22. 
20 Boeles and others (n 16) 29. 
21 Ben Warwick and Colin Murray, ‘What Brexit Means for Future of the Common Travel Area 
between Ireland and the UK’ The Conversation (26 February 2019) 
<http://theconversation.com/what-brexit-means-for-future-of-the-common-travel-area-between-
ireland-and-the-uk-112312> accessed 6 May 2019. 
22 Huber (n 15) 2–3. Such obligations would include observing the right to family life under Article 8 
ECHR, as outlined under the Kurić doctrine: Kurić and Others v Slovenia (13 July 2010), Application 
No. 26828/06, paras 351 and 352. For commentary, see Annette Schrauwen, ‘(Not) Losing out from 
Brexit’ (2017) 1 Europe and the World 1, 5–6. 
23 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from 
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community [2019] XT 21028/19 19. 
One may ask whether such political and diplomatic declarations translate to a meaningful 
'special status' for EU citizens in the UK post-Brexit or are they just mere rhetoric. What 
does the WA and Political Declaration24 say about the 'special status' of EU citizens in the UK 
and UK nationals in the EU?  
The WA provisions allow for two options: preserving EU rights via a national 
application procedure (Article 18.1 WA), or a more simplistic declaratory procedure (Article 
18.4 WA). By implementing the UK Settlement Scheme,25 the UK opted for a more 
demanding application procedure, which was fully rolled on 30 March 2019. Given that the 
Scheme remains the only certainty for the future protection of EU-27 rights in the UK, it is 
worth looking at it in more detail, to illuminate its successes (the UK Government view) and 
challenges (the civil society view) so far.  
 
3.1. The practical arrangements of the UK Settlement Scheme 
From the point of the Home Office (the Government department responsible for UK 
implementing migration policies), the UK Settlement Scheme seems to be going well. It was 
first piloted across twelve NHS Trusts and three universities, with 1,000 EU applicants 
taking part in the trial.26 The second pilot27 saw almost 30,000 applications submitted in 
November-December 2018, with some vulnerable applicants being supported by community 
advice organisations and charities. This second pilot included the EU Exit: ID Document 
Check app, which has been noted as problematic, not least because it was only available on 
 
24 Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom [2018] XT 21095/18 18. 
25 Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Applicant Information’ (GOV.UK) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/eu-settlement-scheme-applicant-information> 
accessed 6 August 2019. 
26 UK Home Office, ‘Final EU Settlement Scheme – Private Beta Testing Phase 1 Report’ (2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-settlement-scheme-public-beta-testing-phase-
report/eu-settlement-scheme-public-beta-testing-phase-report> accessed 5 August 2019. 
27 UK Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme - Private Beta Testing Phase 2 Report’ (2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-settlement-scheme-public-beta-testing-phase-
report/eu-settlement-scheme-public-beta-testing-phase-report> accessed 5 August 2019. 
Android and not on Apple devices, which is now being addressed.28 The purpose of the 
testing was to streamline how employment and tax data held by the public authorities is used 
to support Settlement Scheme applications.  
The Scheme, for which the application charge has been removed, opened fully on 30 
March 2019 and consists of three key steps: proving one’s identity, showing that they live in 
the UK, and declaring any criminal convictions. It is open to all those currently here under 
EU law, including the non-EEA family members of EEA and Swiss citizens.29 
According to the latest data, the total number of applications received up to 30 June 
2019 was 909,300, with 805,500 decisions made (65% have been awarded settled status, 
35% pre-settled status and 0.3% faced ‘other outcomes’).30 Polish, Romanian and Italian 
nationals have been most active to apply.31 Thus, in the eyes of the Home Office, EU citizens 
have a ‘significant period of transition’ time to apply and obtain settled or pre-settled 
status,32 i.e. until 2021, when the new border and immigration system will be introduced. 33 
According to the Home Office’s own surveys, user feedback on the online applications 
system, has also been positive, noting that the service is ‘widely accessible’ and ‘great 
majority of users will not require any assistance’, while those in need of help will be 
supported by a call centre.34 
 
 
28 Sam Trendall, ‘Home Office Holds Firm on Digital-Only Status for EU Settlement Scheme’ 
PublicTechnology.net (25 July 2019) <https://www.publictechnology.net/articles/news/home-office-
holds-firm-digital-only-status-eu-settlement-scheme> accessed 6 August 2019. 
29 Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme Statistics, June 2019’ (2019) 3. 
30 Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme Statistics, June 2019’ (n 30). 
31 ibid 2. 
32 Settled Status is awarded to EU citizens who have resided lawfully and continuously in the UK for 
five years or longer prior to 31 December 2020. Pre-Settled status is awarded to those who resided for 
less than five years and it carries more limited residence rights than the Settled Status. For 
comparison, see Melissa Macdonald, ‘EU Settlement Scheme’ (2019) House of Commons Library 
Briefing Paper 8584. 
33 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Government Response to 
the Committee’s Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19’ (2019) HC 2592 9. 
34 ibid. 
3.2. The Settled Status challenges 
The approach that the UK has taken via the EU Settlement Scheme has been 
criticised by many, not just because it is an application – and not a declaratory – process at 
the end of which those who did not obtain a settled or pre-settled status will become illegal 
migrants on the UK soil.35 Wider criticisms have been raised regarding the practical 
implementation aspects of the Scheme.36 . Alternative proposals have been put forward 
including securing a no-deportation result for those who cannot apply before the short 
deadline of the Scheme.37 Political theorists called for the UK to allow fully-pledged 
automatic naturalisation rights for EU citizens resident before the Brexit vote, rather than 
treating them as permanent guests38 or live-in servants.39 Legal scholars argued for a less 
ambitious ‘EU protected citizen’40 or UK-EU citizenship41 status.  
From the point of view of civil society, the biggest problem to date with the UK 
Settlement Scheme has been its personal scope: originally, it did not cover all types of 
persons that EU citizenship covered.42 Secondly, the passed national legislation allows for 
 
35 Groups such as The3Million (a campaign group representing EU citizens in the UK) and the House 
of Commons Home Affairs Committee support a declaratory approach. See Nicola Newson, ‘EEA 
Nationals (Indefinite Leave to Remain) Bill [HL] HL Bill 38 of 2017–19. House of Lords Library 
Briefing’ (House of Lords Library 2019) Lords Library notes LLN-2019-0092. 
36 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (n 34); the3Million, ‘The UK EU Settlement Scheme 
(UKEUSS) – on the Ground’ 
<https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/0d3854_54946819c6b445cd9675b7e14d5f77d3.pdf> accessed 7 
August 2019. 
37 the3Million, ‘EEA Nationals (Indefinite Leave to Remain) Bill - Briefing for Lords Second Reading. 
EU Settlement Scheme: From a Constitutive to Declaratory System’ (2019). 
38 Huber (n 15) 7. This is similar to the fast-track nationality proposal by Susie Alegre, except the latter 
argues for retention of the previous nationality, resulting in larger numbers of EU citizens with dual 
nationalities: Georgia Austin-Greenall and Sylwia Lipinska, ‘Brexit and Loss of EU Citizenship: Cases, 
Options, Perceptions’ (ECAS 2017) 23 <http://ecas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Brexit-and-
Loss-of-EU-Citizenship-1.pdf> accessed 6 May 2019. 
39 Michael Brookes, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books 1983) 52. 
40 Kostakopoulou, ‘Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post-Brexit and the European Union’s Duty to 
Protect EU Citizens’ (n 12). 
41 Wesemann (n 19) 21–25. 
42 Some accommodation has now been made for those with a derivative right to reside based on the 
CJEU judgments in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, Case C-200/02 Chen 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, Case Ibrahim C-310/08 ECLI:EU:C:2010:80 and Case Teixeira C-480/08 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:83: Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Derivative Right to Reside (Chen and 
Ibrahim/Teixeira Cases). Guidance for Caseworkers. Version 1.0’. Note that the Surinder Singh 
situations (returnees and their family members) and Lounes cases (dual British and EEA citizens) are 
greater discretion for UK migration bodies to remove/prevent from entering EU-27 nationals 
to its territory post-Brexit.43 Thirdly, considerations about vulnerable EU citizens and their 
access to the Settled Status remain high.44 For example, in the event of a no deal, EU citizens 
will be able to enter the UK to visit, work or study after 31 October 2019. For stays longer 
than 3 months, a newly introduced European Temporary Leave to Remain will be required.45 
In the fourth place, the concerns about the digital divide remain, as the Home Office 
continues to refuse issuing non-digital proof of status for those who obtained it (fearing the 
possibility of fraud and counterfeiting, or people being controlled in domestic violence, 
modern slavery and human trafficking situations),46 despite the call for this to be introduced 
by Parliament in the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee47 and in the House of 
Lords European Union Committee.48 
Overall, the Settled Status offers much more limited rights to non-Irish EU citizens in 
the post-Brexit UK: it ‘focusses on the establishment of a new right to reside … and as such 
moves even further away from the rights EU citizenship entails.’49 
 
 
also covered: Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Written Statement - HCWS1387’. See Case C-
370/90 Surinder Singh, ECLI:EU:C:1992:296; Case C-165/16 Lounes, ECLI:EU:C:2017:862. 
43 Conor James McKinney, ‘How New Immigration Regulations Will Make It Easier to Deport EU 
Citizens after Brexit’ Free Movement (13 March 2019) <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/how-new-
immigration-regulations-will-make-it-easier-to-deport-eu-citizens-after-brexit/> accessed 17 March 
2019. 
44 Madeleine Sumption and Zovanga Kone, ‘Unsettled Status? Which EU Citizens Are at Risk of 
Failing to Secure Their Rights after Brexit?’ (COMPAS, University of Oxford 2018) Migration 
Observatory Report. 
45 Home Office and UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Government Outlines No Deal Arrangements for EU 
Citizens’ (28 January 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-outlines-no-deal-
arrangements-for-eu-citizens> accessed 28 August 2019. 
46 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (n 34) 9–10. 
47 Trendall (n 29). 
48 Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws, ‘EU Settlement Scheme. Letter from the Chairman of EU Justice 
Sub-Committee to Home Secretary’ (27 February 2019) 
<https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-justice-
subcommittee/CWM/HKtoSJ-SettledStatus-260219.pdf> accessed 9 August 2019. 
49 Wesemann (n 19) 12. 
4. UK Nationals in EU-27 
Having considered the rights of EU citizens in the post-Brexit UK, let us now assess what 
future rights UK nationals will possess in Member States as third-country nationals (TCNs) 
and evaluate the implications the change of their rights may have to the concept of EU 
citizenship. 
 
4.1. Defining a third-country national (TCN) 
Vast differences exist between the rights awarded to EU citizens and TNCs by EU law 
and by EU international treaties between the EU and other countries. To begin with, even 
the definition of TCNs is not straightforward, highlighting that some categories of TCNs are 
more special than others. By default, a third-country national is defined as ‘any person who 
is not a Union citizen within the meaning of Article 20 TFEU’.50 However, Boeles points to 
Article 2(6) of the Schengen Border Code that grants preferential treatment to the nationals 
of the countries who are part of the European Economic Area Treaty and the EU-Switzerland 
Agreement (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland). Thus, any distinction between EU 
citizens and non-citizens is nuanced and complex: not every person from a third country is 
treated the same by EU law, and some are awarded a ‘special’ status.51  
Connecting EU citizenship and immigration law, Wiesbrock distinguishes four 
categories of TCNs,52 based on the extent of rights awarded to them in the EU. The first 
category is that of ‘privileged’ TCNs: family members of EU citizens who have made use of 
their free movement rights, hence their generous rights are governed by Directive 2004/3853 
and the Regulation 492/2011.54 The second category is that of ‘semi’ privileged TNCs: family 
members of EU citizens who have not made use of their free movement rights in the EU 
 
50 Boeles and others (n 16) 128. 
51 ibid 37. 
52 Anja Wiesbrock, Legal Migration to the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff 2010) 11, 93–161. 
53 Directive (EC) 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
54 Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 
(‘internal situations’),55 hence their rights are governed by the national law of the state of 
residence. The third category contains those holding a certain nationality that is awarded 
preferential treatment in by specific agreements between their country of origin and the 
EU.56 The most generous treatment under these agreements is awarded to the nationals of 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway (the EFTA states) and Switzerland (the Swiss agreements), 
followed by Turkish nationals (under the EU-Turkey agreements).57 The fourth category 
covers those legally resident in the EU (other than from the UK, Ireland or Denmark) and 
not covered by any of the above legal regimes. Such persons are governed by EU legislation 
on TCNs. 
While the legal situation of EU-27 nationals in the UK is complex, a no-deal Brexit 
presents a future of even higher uncertainty for UK nationals travelling, working, studying or 
living in EU-27 states.58  Many commentators agree that negotiating a trade/partnership 
treaty between the UK and the EU will be complex and hence is likely to take time.59 During 
this period of negotiations, if the Withdrawal Agreement is not signed, UK citizens abroad 
 
55 Stefano Montaldo, ‘Freedom of Movement, Social Integration and Naturalization: Testing Reverse 
Discrimination in the Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice’ (2018) 3 European Papers 1481. 
56 Dimitry Kochenov and Martijn van den Brink, ‘Pretending There Is No Union: Non-Derivative 
Quasi-Citzenship Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the EU’, Rights of Third-Country Nationals 
under EU Association Agreements, vol 9 (Brill / Nijhoff 2015). 
57 Note there are other countries that have an agreement with the EU (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Russia, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Andorra, San Marino, 79 countries of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) under which their nationals who work legally in an EU 
Member state are entitled to the same working conditions as the nationals of their host country, but 
their residence and movement rights are non-existent or fall short of those available to the nationals 
of the EFTA states and Switzerland. For example, the nationals of the European micro-states 
(Andorra, Monaco, San Marino) do not have access to the free movement of persons in the whole EU 
internal market and only benefit from bilateral arrangements with the neighbouring Member States: 
European Commission, ‘Relations with the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the 
Republic of San Marino Options for Closer Integration with the EU (Communication)’ (2013) 
COM/2012/0680 final/2. 
58 Schrauwen (n 23); Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship and Free Movement in a Changing EU: Navigating an 
Archipelago of Contradictions’ in Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger (eds), Brexit and Beyond: 
Rethinking the Futures of Europe (UCL Press 2018); Meghan Benton, Safe or Sorry? Prospects for 
Britons in the European Union after Brexit (Migration Policy Institute Europe 2017); Elspeth Guild, 
Steve Peers and Jonathan Kingham, ‘After a Hard BREXIT - British Citizens and Residence in the EU’ 
(2017) 31 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 121. 
59 See e.g. Christa Tobler, ‘One of Many Challenges after “Brexit”: The Institutional Framework of an 
Alternative Agreement — Lessons from Switzerland and Elsewhere?’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 575; Herwig Verschueren, ‘Scenarios for Brexit and Social Security’ 
(2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 367. 
will remain treated as TCNs under EU law, also heavily dependent on the mercy of host 
Member State regulation. Therefore, the absence of transitional legal arrangements between 
the UK and the EU means that the treatment of UK nationals will likely depend on three 
sources of legal rules from which their rights could be derived: national law of the host 
Member State; any bilateral agreements that the UK and the host State may have entered 
into; EU law (on e.g. long-term resident TCNs); any EU-UK arrangements on travel and 
short-term residence that may be reached before 31 October 2019. Let us consider each of 
the above TCN categories in turn, complementing them with TCN investors, who became 
more prominent after Wiesbrock’s classification was introduced, in order to determine what 
rights may be afforded for UK nationals in the EU-27 post-Brexit.   
 
4.2. TCN rights as ‘extended’ EU citizenship 
The first category of privileged TCNs are TCN family members of EU citizens. They have 
derived residence, work and education rights under EU law, allowing UK nationals to benefit 
from such legal status post-Brexit. In this sense, one could argue that such ‘extended’ EU 
citizenship may benefit those who can be classified as ‘family members’ under Articles 2 and 
3 of the Citizenship Directive.60 However, drawing a conclusion on whether one is a family 
member of an EU citizen, especially if they are a TCN, is not always a straightforward task. 
There are two key difficulties. Namely, the legal definition of a ‘family member’ under EU 
law is not clear-cut: there exist legal complexities regarding the situation of carers and 
dependents.61 Secondly, both the EU citizens and their TCN family member may be in what 
is called a purely internal situation (i.e. in factual circumstances where they had not moved 
to another EU Member State) that leaves them outside the scope of application of EU law. 
 
60 Directive (EC) 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77 38. 
61 Nathan Cambien, ‘EU Citizenship and the Right to Care’ in Dimitry Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship 
and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017).  
This means they will not be able to benefit from the EU citizenship rights because the latter 
are attached to de facto mobility.  
 In relation to internal situations,62 EU law allows Member States to treat their 
nationals less favourably than Union citizens who rely on EU law rights.63 Such legal 
treatment has been criticised as reversely discriminatory, devouring European citizenship of 
any meaningful free-standing status and ‘separating Union citizens in differentiated 
regimes.’64 Despite this, and the long line of cases calling for the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights of the EU citizenship granted under Article 20 TFEU,65 the Court of 
Justice remains faithful to the vertical balance of competences in the field of intra-Union 
migration established by the Treaties: for EU law to apply, a cross-border movement to 
another Member State is required.  
The older CJEU case law in relation to internal situations indicated that EU 
citizenship had no substance and in effect was just another format of migration law that 
depends on one’s nationality, family relationships with an EU citizen and the socio-economic 
ability to move across borders. However, there seems to be some light of hope on this matter 
and that in particular situations a cross-border movement requirement could be avoided. In 
the cases of O&B66 and S&G67 the Court clarified that returnees68 and frontier workers would 
be covered by the right not to be discriminated because of their previous movement, with EU 
law protection being extended to their family members. Similarly, as the Lounes case 
 
62115/78 Knoors [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:31; C-132/93 Steen [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:254; Joined 
Cases C-64/96 and C-65/06 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:285; C-165/16 Lounes 
[2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:862.  
63 Montaldo (n 56) 1485. 
64 Montaldo (n 56) 1484. 
65 C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:124; C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:277; C-256/11 Dereci [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:734; C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:354; C-82/16 KA and Others [2018] EU:C:2018:308.  
66 C-456/12 O&B [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:135.  
67 C-457/12 S&G [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:136.  
68 Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38 guarantees EU law protection only for those ‘who move to or 
reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national’ (emphasis added). 
demonstrates,69 an EU citizen (and their TCN family members) who moved to another 
Member State and then naturalised by taking up its nationality 20 years later would be 
covered by EU law, i.e. not treated as being in purely internal situations. Similar reasoning 
would apply to those with double nationalities, who moved to live in one of the Member 
States of their nationality.70 These cases, dating back to 2014-17, indicate that the Court is 
trying to find ways to identify the existence of a cross-border element, bringing several 
factually diverse situations under the realm of EU law, in order to avoid resorting to the 
internal situation doctrine.  
While such outcomes may give hope to some of the UK nationals who are family 
members of EU citizens in EU27 after Brexit, clearly such piecemeal case-by-case judicial 
method falls short of what a revision of the Treaties could offer. Despite desirability for legal 
certainty that could be offered by revisions of EU primary law,71 EU Treaty revision is 
currently unlikely to happen, given the differing political preferences and national agendas 
on migration from within and outside the EU. Ultimately, even if UK nationals (TCNs) are 
classified as family members under the Citizenship Directive post-Brexit, and satisfy the 
cross-border requirement, they will become less protected, for example, regarding the 
retention of the right of residence in cases where their EU citizen family member dies or 
departs from the host Member State,72 or if there is a divorce, annulment of marriage or 
termination of registered partnership.73 This further illustrates the downgrading of Union 
citizenship rights that will occur after Brexit when UK nationals will become TCNs in the EU. 
 
69 C-165/16 Lounes (n 64).  
70 C-541/15 Freitag [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:432.  
71 Wesemann correctly observes that the Lisbon Treaty introduces Article 50 TFEU (a Member State’s 
right to leave), but failed to make any amendments in this regard to Articles 20 and 21 TFEU (EU 
citizenship), thus leaving a gap in the existing primary law framework on how EU citizens’ rights are 
to be protected in a Brexit-like situation: Wesemann (n 19) 13. On current political and legal 
impossibility to reform EU citizenship into a self-standing status, see Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU 
Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union: How Inevitable Is the Radical Downgrading of Rights?’ 
in Carlos Closa (ed), Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European Union: 
Troubled Membership (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
72 Compare Article 12(1) vs Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/38. 
73 Compare Article 13(1) vs Article 13(2) of Directive 2004/38. 
 To sum up, while UK nationals who are family members of EU citizens can benefit 
from derived rights as ‘extended’ EU citizenship, such legal status is not equivalent to that 
awarded to EU citizens directly and will constitute a reduction in the rights of residence, 
work, education or social assistance currently awarded to UK nationals as EU citizens. 
 
4.3. Privileged TCNs: EU Association and Partnership Agreements 
As mentioned earlier, not all TCNs are treated equally by EU law, hence another privileged 
category of TCNs are the nationals of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland or Turkey, 
all of whom are protected under international agreements with the EU. While nationals of 
these countries do not benefit from fully-fledged EU citizenship rights, they have been 
granted some rights that other TCNs have not. One example of their privileged status is the 
right to travel in the EU without visa restrictions, i.e. on the same legal basis as EU citizens 
do. This is because Regulation 2018/180674 harmonises the list of third countries whose 
citizens are required to be in possession of a visa in order to cross external borders of the 
European Union (negative list, Annex I to the Regulation), and of third countries whose 
nationals are exempt from this requirement (positive list, Annex II to the Regulation).75  The 
visa exemption for Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein flows from the agreement in the 
European Economic Area.76  The no-visa regime for Swiss nationals stems from the EU Swiss 
agreement.77 These international agreements signed by the EU represent a more exclusive 
‘club’ of national and European relations and may serve as aspirations for the future of UK’s 
trade agreement with the EU, especially as a no-deal withdrawal is likely to put UK nationals 
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77 OJ L114/6, 2002; Recital 7 of ibid. 
at a more disadvantageous position than, for example, Moroccans or Russians.78 
Nevertheless, even if UK nationals’ rights are protected in a similar way, this will not equate 
to the protection of EU citizenship rights that they possess pre-Brexit, which means they will 
lose some of the current rights they are entitled to under EU law. 
 
4.4. 'Show Me Your Money': TCN Investors  
A third category of privileged TCNs, not mentioned by Wiesbrock, concerns TCNs who can 
obtain the nationality of a Member State by taking part in a national investment scheme,79 in 
turn becoming EU citizens. Considerations on how certain Member States monetize EU 
citizenship by offering 'golden passports' and ‘golden residences’ provide a good example of 
the ‘nationalisation’ of EU free movement rights and raise ethical and social justice questions 
on whether EU citizenship should be for sale.80 
As an alternative policy choice to EU citizenship by investment, there was a proposal 
for an Associate Citizenship. This idea originated in the European Parliament in 2016, 
suggesting to allow nationals of a former Member State to continue benefitting from the 
freedoms to live, work and travel within the EU and to vote in European elections if they pay 
a set fee to the EU budget.81 In this way, associate EU citizenship is very similar to the 
‘citizenship-by-investment’, raising similar reservations. In addition, the associate 
citizenship proposal, while creative and ambitious, has been criticised by Shaw as utopian 
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and unpractical.82 Similarly, Kochenov and Van den Brink83 argue that it would go against 
the letter of Article 20 TFEU,84 fail to respect reciprocity - key principle of international 
cooperation – in future EU-UK relations, ‘potentially undermining the interests of EU 
citizens’85 and would be undemocratic, especially in relation to political rights,86 creating a 
second-class EU citizenship. In their view, the doctrine of acquired rights87 - which is absent 
from the Treaties but features in the Court of Justice jurisprudence88 - cannot be interpreted 
too liberally, because doing so would put the effectiveness of EU law (Article 50 TFEU) in 
danger and could encourage more Member States to withdraw from the Union in the 
future.89 In support of their view, Schrauwen, too, notes that ‘residence rights are not 
acquired rights, nor is there the possibility to enforce acquired rights.’90 Therefore, it seems 
that the concept of acquired rights cannot be used to extend the scope of EU citizenship as an 
independent status neither for UK nationals in the EU-27 nor for EU citizens in the UK after 
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4.5. Other TCNs 
Given that Article 20 TFEU will not be applicable on Brexit day, UK nationals in the EU who 
are not family members of EU citizens, investors or hold the nationality of a privileged state, 
but have lived there legally and continuously for five years or longer and would meet other 
required conditions (e.g. language requirements), would need to secure their residency rights 
based on the Long-Term TCN Residents Directive (hereafter TCN Residents Directive).91 
There may be also other EU legislation that will become applicable to TCN UK nationals,92 
and some of it will be unfamiliar to many UK immigration lawyers because of the current UK 
opt-outs.93 Thus, in preparation for no-deal, the Commission urged Member States by the 
withdrawal date to ‘issue temporary residence documents, until definitive residence permits 
can be issued’94 under the TCN Residents Directive (for the UK nationals with at least five 
years of continuous legal residence) or to apply other EU or national law (for UK nationals 
who have resided in the host state for less than five years).  
While falling back on the TCN Directive may be somewhat reassuring for the Brits 
living in the EU post-Brexit, this Union legislation does not offer the same rights as EU 
citizenship. To begin with, full free movement rights within the EU are only secured after one 
has been legally resident in one Member Sate for five years,95 and the Directive only allows 
absences from the EU of 12 months.96 The Directive’s equal treatment provisions, 
 
91 Directive (EC) 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents [2003] OJ L16/44 109. For commentary, see Steve Peers, ‘UK Citizens as Non-EU Citizens 
in the EU after Brexit: Applying the EU Directive on Non-EU Long-Term Residents’ (EU Law 
Analysis, 27 December 2018) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/12/uk-citizens-as-non-eu-
citizens-in-eu.html> accessed 5 August 2019. Note the Directive would not apply to UK nationals 
residing in Denmark and Ireland, as these Member States opted out from EU migration law 
provisions: Guild, Peers and Kingham (n 60) 128. 
92 Such as on the admission of students and researchers: Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of 
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final 4. 
95 Article 4(1). 
96 Article 9. 
guaranteeing conditional rights97 to access to, for example, study grants, social assistance 
and tax benefits,98 have been viewed as short of those guaranteed under EU citizenship, 
too.99 In addition, Under Article 5(2) of the Directive, the ‘host Member States can demand 
compliance with national integration measures, request evidence of stable and regular 
resources, and can reject an application on grounds of public policy or public security.’100 
Similarly, those UK nationals who move because they provide a service across borders (and 
do not seek employment) will find the rules under the Directive more restrictive101 than the 
current legal framework on establishment and free movement of services, or non-existent at 
EU level if they are self-employed.102 
In terms of short-term residence and travel arrangements, the EU agreed visa-free 
travel for UK nationals.103 However, such travel will include border checks and passports 
being stamped, eventually turning into advance electronic checks, like those in the US 
Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA). This will mean that UK nationals 
between the ages of 18 and 70 will be liable to pay a small fee (7 euro) when entering the EU, 
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 Regulation 2019/592 amending Regulation 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement, as regards the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union 
[2019] OJ L103/1. 
as part of the new European Travel Information and Authorisation System that is expected 
to strengthen security checks and to come into force in 2021.104 
Another relevant piece of EU legislation is the Family Reunification Directive:105 
applicable ‘when the TCN family member has an autonomous right of residence and can act 
as sponsor for family reunification.’106 Conditions for family reunification under this 
Directive are more stringent as compared to the generous rules under the Citizenship 
Directive, discussed above. 
Finally, those UK nationals who may not have resided for five years and wish to work 
in a relevant Member State, after Brexit may rely on several other legislative instruments 




5. Future Bilateral and National Arrangements 
Certain transitional arrangements and some form of ‘settled status’ are being made 
available not just to the three million non-UK EU nationals in the UK via the EU Settlement 
Scheme,108 but also to the 1.3 million UK nationals residing in the remaining 27 Member 
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States.109 In addition, on the no-deal Brexit day, some old bilateral agreements that in the 
past were rendered void by the entry into force of EU Treaties and legislation may become 
applicable again. Most likely, they will need to be updated, perhaps re-negotiated. Such 
situation may occur, for example, with cross-border social security rights protection.110 
The EU Commission’s Communication on contingency planning issued in December 
2018111 confirmed that without legislative intervention at individual state level, many of the 
UK nationals abroad would become ‘illegal’ on 31 October 2019. Unsurprisingly, initially 
there were a plethora of various responses from individual Member States how to avoid 
friction to trade and free movement after the ‘Exit Day’.112 These ranged from plans to 
arrange special queues for UK nationals in Portuguese airports,113 to offering ten-year 
residence permits that protect acquired rights in Malta,114 or the promises to guarantee social 
security rights in Germany.115 The circumstances, for example, in the British Overseas 
Territory of Gibraltar116 and the British Crown Dependency of the Isle of Man bring their own 
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complexities, as these territories may have same UK nationality laws but separate 
immigration regulation or application of EU law.117 In the case of no-deal Brexit, British 
nationals (Overseas), British overseas territories citizens (BOTC), British overseas citizens 
(BOC), British protected persons (BPP,) British subjects (BS) are all excluded from the 
requirement to hold a visa for short-term travel via the newly adopted Regulation 
2019/592.118 Despite the Commission’s coordination work with the 27 Member States, states 
remain mostly free to adopt an approach that would suit ‘their legal and administrative 
systems’119 and reflect the number of UK nationals resident on their territory, resulting in a 
varied landscape of residence regimes.  
As Kochenov observes,120 it can be tempting for the UK to address bilateral 
agreements first with those Member States where most UK nationals currently reside (e.g. 
Spain), or with those that are economically advanced and hence do not pose the risk of 
attracting future immigration. Hence it is not surprising that the UK signed international 
agreements with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland to protect each other's citizen rights,121 
with rights of Irish citizens being protected under the Common Travel Area arrangements.  
However, such bilateral agreements are problematic in terms of EU citizenship rights, as 
 
117 The UK’s EU membership extends to include Gibraltar, but not the Isle of Man: see Protocol No. 3 
to the Act of Accession which formed part of the United Kingdom's Treaty of Accession 1972. With 
regard to Gibraltar, see Recital 4 of Regulation 2019/592 amending Regulation 2018/1806 listing the 
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, as regards the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the Union [2019] OJ L103/1 592. The persons who have acquired their British overseas 
citizenship from a connection with Gibraltar (and hence are exempt from short-term visa 
requirement) are listed along with other British overseas territories (Anguilla, Bermuda, British 
Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland 
Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and 
South Sandwich Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands) in Annex II Part 3 of Regulation 2018/1806 
listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement [2018] L 303/39. 
118 Annex II Part 3 of Regulation 2018/1806, as amended by Articles 1(3) and (4) of Regulation 
2019/592. 
119 European Commission, ‘State of Play of Preparations of Contingency Measures for the Withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom from the European Union’ COM(2019) 276 final 4. 
120 Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union: How Inevitable Is the Radical 
Downgrading of Rights?’ (n 74). 
121 Claudia Delpero, ‘UK Agrees with Switzerland, Norway, Iceland to Protect Citizens’ Rights 
Regardless of Brexit Deal’ Europe Street News (10 February 2019) <https://europestreet.news/uk-
switzerland-agree-post-brexit-residents-rights-regardless-of-eu-deal/> accessed 9 February 2019. 
they are done on the basis of each national state’s  capacity, with EU citizenship playing a 
role indirectly or not being considered at all.122 In the context of the EEA, the concept of 
Union citizenship is explicitly excluded from the scope of this agreement,123 which evidences 
that agreeing specific rights of free movement does not equal to the richer protection of 
rights guaranteed for EU citizens. 
 
6. When All is Said and Done 
Losing the rights attached to EU citizenship will be a big loss both to the EU-27 nationals in 
the UK and the UK nationals residing in the EU-27. As this chapter demonstrated, there are 
stark differences in EU citizens’ and TCNs’ rights’ protection,124 depending on the overall EU 
competences, one’s nationality and residence, work, migration, legal status. Typically, EU 
migration and asylum law often has a limited general treatment clause,125 which is less 
generous than EU citizenship legislation, widening the gap between the rights of EU citizens 
and TCNs.  
Brexit has done away with the concept of vested or acquired rights126 that could be 
passportable throughout the Union. Without an alternative legal framework guaranteeing 
legal protection, and without a signed Withdrawal Agreement, many of those caught up in 
between will have to make a hard choice whether to uproot themselves and their families 
from the relevant host Member State, in order to protect, for example, the acquired social 
 
122 Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union: How Inevitable Is the Radical 
Downgrading of Rights?’ (n 74) 30. 
123 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 158/2007 of 7 December 2007 amending Annex V (Free 
movement of workers) and Annex VIII (Right of establishment) to the EEA Agreement [2008] OJ 
L124/20, Recital 8. See also Donegan and Teo (n 90) 567–568. 
124 Iglesias Sánchez (n 8). 
125 ibid 256. 
126 Jan-Jaap Kuipers, ‘Cartesio and Grunkin-Paul: Mutual Recognition as a Vested Rights Theory 
Based on Party Autonomy in Private Law’ (2009) 2 European Journal of Legal Studies 66; Coutts (n 
11) 237–238.  
security rights, such as pensions,127 or whether to seek a more ‘convenient’ nationality via 
naturalisation or other available means (e.g. ancestry). 
Such plethora of legal regulations and the fragmented landscape of rights is 
problematic not only to those who will move across European and UK borders after Brexit. It 
is  ‘a deeply problematic practice from the point of view of non-discrimination and the basic 
idea of European unity.’128 They indicate that any European unity on the matter may be just 
an illusion, with wide margin of discretion left in the hands of national regulation when it 
comes to matters of nationality, political membership and the welfare state. One such trend, 
for example, is the discretion that the Court of Justice leaves to Member States when 
determining how integrated a foreigner must be before they can claim social rights. The EU 
citizenship cases on this point have received extensive commentary,129 and so have the TCNs 
cases where national law that makes social rights entitlement conditional to compulsory 
participation in integration programmes is considered justified.130 Making social rights 
conditional on a certain length of residence or financial contribution is a commonality that is 
likely to be retained by most Member States, especially as migration flows increase, borders 
continue to remain porous, and free movement continues to be closely associated with 
economic activity.131  
Such more demanding conditions of integration for accessing welfare rights in the 
country of residence are likely to be strengthened by other - cultural, national identity - 
conditions132 with which foreigners will be increasingly required to comply. Additionally, 
 
127 Helen McCarthy, ‘The End of the Retirement Dream? British Pensioners in the European Union 
after Brexit’ (2018) 10 MPI Europe Brief 1. 
128 Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union: How Inevitable Is the Radical 
Downgrading of Rights?’ (n 74). 
129 C-140/12 Brey [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:565; C-333/13 Dano [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358; C-
67/14 Alimanovic [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:597; C-299/14 García-Nieto [2016] EU:C:2016:114; C-
308/14 Commission v UK [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. 
130 See the cases discussed in Karin De Vries, ‘The Integration Exception: A New Limit to Social Rights 
of Third-Country Nationals in European Union Law?’ in Daniel Thym (ed), Questioning EU 
Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart Publishing 
2017) 267. 
131 Shaw (n 60). 
132 De Vries (n 142) 270. 
Member States, such as Lithuania, which recently considered allowing a second nationality 
for Lithuanian nationals, cautiously proposed to do so only on the condition that such new 
national allegiance does not contradict the national values and the international pro-Western 
commitments of the Lithuanian state,133 in this way enforcing certain values for any 
Lithuanians with double nationalities. 
Similar retreat to the national competence is also seen in the right to family life 
context. One only needs to compare the Court's reasoning in the Carpenter decision134 of 
2002 and the S&G135 and O&B 136 cases in 2014. In the latter, the Court ruled on the basis of 
the Directive 2004/38, stating that the EU citizen’s movement to a host Member State 
should be ‘genuine’ (i.e. holidays and weekends do not count), in order for derived residence 
rights to be created for a TCN who is a family member of the EU citizen; and that such 
movement should enable the EU citizen to ‘create or strengthen’ family life.137 Thus, it may 
be easier to demonstrate the ‘effective exercise of the fundamental freedom guaranteed by 
Article 45 TFEU’ if childcare to EU citizen’s children was provided directly by their TCN 
spouse, as opposed to the TCN spouse’s parents.138 Such judicial retreat to black-letter law 
(literal) interpretation of the Citizenship Directive and restrictive interpretation of Articles 
45 and 21(1) TFEU raise questions to what extent the CJEU may be willing to act as a 
protector of all mobile EU citizens' and their TCN family member’s rights post-Brexit. Are 
EU citizens in the UK and EU-27 going to be treated less like citizens, more like migrants? 
As for the UK, without delay it will have to shape its own migration policy. One 
suggestion is to adopt a ‘managed movement’ approach, which would allow to have a break 
 
133 Despite this, the referendum in May 2019 rejected such a proposal, and a new generation of 
expatriate Lithuanians remain restricted to one passport only: LRT, ‘Lithuania’s citizenship 
referendum: necessary but rushed vote’ lrt.lt (8 May 2019) <https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/news-in-
english/19/1056843/lithuania-s-citizenship-referendum-necessary-but-rushed-vote> accessed 6 
August 2019. 
134 C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:434. 
135 C-457/12 S&G (n 70). 
136 C-456/12 O&B (n 69). For commentary, see Boeles and others (n 16) 76–77. 
137 C-456/12 O&B (n 69) paras 56, 59. 
138 C-457/12 S&G (n 70) paras 42–44. 
clause when a sudden influx of migration occurs, building on the emergency break clauses 
available under ‘Article 112 of the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty, the Liechtenstein 
Protocol, and the Swiss agreement giving priority for local hires.’139 Similarly, another 
proposal, which draws on the comparison of the EU rights of free movement and the EEA 
law, is to introduce certain intra-European migration controls, like the ones proposed in the 
pre-Brexit Cameron deal140 that are in place for Liechtenstein.141 The White Paper on UK 
Immigration that sets out UK’s post-Brexit immigration system was published at the end of 
2018,142 and it remains to be seen how Prime Minister Boris Johnson directs his government 
to take it forward. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The future both for the UK and for the EU looks less like a promised land of milk and honey 
and more of an enchanted forest, inhabited by ‘monsters’ of complex legal rules and ‘witches’ 
of fast-changing political priorities. Looking from a broader perspective, the loss of EU 
citizenship rights for those living in the UK may not be as problematic, as compared to UK 
nationals in EU-27. The former are to lose EU citizenship in the territory of one ex-Member 
State, while the latter will lose it forever and will fall under a different set of rights, regulated 
by the increasingly more complex legal landscape – until the new future agreement between 
the UK and the EU is reached.143 
 
139 Catherine Barnard and Sarah Fraser-Butlin, ‘Free Movement vs. Fair Movement: Brexit and 
Managed Migration’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 203. 
140 For critical assessment of the deal, see Stephanie Reynolds, ‘(De)Constructing the Road to Brexit: 
Paving the Way to Further Limitations on Free Movement and Equal Treatment?’ in Daniel Thym 
(ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU 
(Hart Publishing 2017). 
141 Donegan and Teo (n 90). 
142 HM Government, ‘The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System’ (2018). For assessment and 
recommendations, see Heather Rolfe, ‘Challenges for Immigration Policy in Post-Brexit Britain: 
Introduction’ (2019) 248 National Institute Economic Review R1 and other contributions in the same 
special issue of this journal. 
143 One of the suggested options for the future UK-EU relationship was the Swiss model. However, it is 
not without trouble: the events since 2014 illustrate that the free movement and financial industry 
access to the EU market are thorny issues over which both parties are still having disagreements in 
order to reach a wide framework agreement to replace the existing 120 bilateral sectoral treaties. See  
There are no easy solutions for the future of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals 
in the EU-27. Some scholars have suggested creating a new citizenship status,144 while others 
proposed a ‘EU protected citizen’ status,145 automatic naturalisation146 and even laissez-
passer European passports.147 None of these options are without their criticisms, and to date 
they failed to appeal to the good will either of the European Commission or the UK 
Government. 
The legal and political matters underpinning Brexit demonstrate that European 
citizenship seems to remain just ‘a shadow of nationality’148 of the Member States. It is very 
far away from the normative ideal of society with communities of ‘concern and engagement’, 
where equality, political and welfare rights would be all-inclusive and protected as such at 
transnational level.149 While short of this ideal, the legal-political Union citizenship is much 
more than a mere residence status; it is rich with political, social rights and rights extended 
to EU citizens’ family members. Seeing it reduced to a set of migratory rules by the various 
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european-union-58817> accessed 6 May 2019; Francesco Guarascio, ‘UPDATE 2-EU Grants Six-
Month Reprieve to Swiss Exchanges, Wants New Treaty’ Reuters (17 December 2018) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/swiss-eu-idUSL8N1YM28W> accessed 6 May 2019; Susan 
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/44865230> accessed 6 May 2019. 
144 Wesemann (n 19). 
145 Kostakopoulou (n 66). 
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settled-status-type arrangements in the current 28 Member States is troublesome and raises 
questions for the future success of EU citizenship in the European project. Who - or what - 
may save it, only time will show. 
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